Theory: Deterministic formal models assume that voters make decisions with certainty while probabilistic models assume that voters' intentions are uncertain. Because of their different assumptions, the models produce different equilibrium results, yet there are no criteria for selecting one over the other.
question. While other researchers have attempted to estimate the probabilistic nature of vote preferences indirectly, this analysis is one of the first to rely on probabilities actually reported by respondents. By comparing these responses to their deterministic counterparts, the empirical test illuminates a contemporary debate in the voting theory literature. I conclude that, at both the individual and aggregate levels, the probabilistic questions perform at least as well as deterministic ones, providing support for development of the newer models. For large electorates responding to informative campaigns, the two models are similar on a number of grounds. Rather than regard deterministic and probabilistic models as interchangeable, however, I suggest conditions where each is most appropriate.
Formal Voting Models
Classic voting and elections theories are deterministic in nature. These spatial proximity models generally posit that voters select candidates who are nearest their ideal points along one or more dimensions. The most familiar formal theoretic results, such as the Median Voter Theorem and other convergence predictions (Black 1958; Downs 1957) , are based on deterministic assumptions applied to two-candidate elections under majority rule (see Enelow and Hinich 1984) . Voters are thought to prefer the candidates perceived nearest them with certainty. An illustration of the simple unidimensional case is presented in Figure 1 . The voter's ideal point is located at xi on dimension X while two candidates are initially positioned at a and b. If the voter has a strictly quasiconcave utility function maximized at the ideal point, he or she will strictly prefer the candidate located at a. Even if the other candidate approaches the voter's ideal point by moving to b', the voter will still vote for a. If, however, the candidate moves again, to b'', then the voter will choose her or him rather than a, who is now further away. Even though |b' -b''| < |b -b'|, the second move changes the behavior of the voter. This is classic deterministic voting in a unidimensional policy space.
Figure 1 about here
Of course, many of the richest voting models allow for more than one dimension and a variety of assumptions. If an equilibrium exists in these models, it is generally the median in all directions or a similar centrist outcome (Calvert 1985; Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich 1972; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970; Enelow and Hinich 1983; 1984; Plott 1967) . More often instability is the norm as any point may be a winning or losing outcome and cycles are possible under multidimensional majority rule (Enelow and Hinich 1984; McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978) . Though the results are somewhat different from unidimensional models, the assumptions remain deterministic (see Ordeshook 1986 for a review).
In addition to normative concerns about instability, criticisms of traditional models have focused on the unrealistic nature of voter reactions to candidate position changes. Empirically, it may seem unnatural for voter x in Figure 1 to vote for a with certainty when competing with b' because of a small proximity advantage. Further, moving a short distance along the continuum from b' to b'' should not raise the probability of voting for the candidate from zero to one. Real people, it might be argued, simply do not make decisions this acutely. Mueller (1989, 199) summarizes this concern for verisimilitude, arguing that "deterministic models assume that vote choices gyrate schizophrenically as candidates move about competing for votes." Empirical realities have thus lead some to question the traditional model. Fiorina (1981, 155) , for instance, argues that "real decision makers are best analyzed in probabilistic rather than deterministic terms." 1 Concerns about the Downsian approach, then, have generally sprung from doubts about the ability of highly abstract, deterministic theories to aptly model real voting behavior.
The primary alternatives to the classical approach may be broadly categorized as probabilistic.
These models assume that voters are uncertain and that decisions are based on probability distributions over positions. 2 Despite different interpretations of the uncertainty that defines these models, probabilistic theories share a number of characteristics. The underlying premise is that voters all do not behave exactly as one might expect in a certain world. There is a stochastic or even unknown element that contributes to decision-making. Some theorists treat this from the elite side, arguing that candidates are unsure of how voters will choose (Coughlin 1992; Ordeshook 1986 ). Voters might rely on some nonpolicy criteria, such as candidate attributes, when deciding. Without this information, candidates must maximize their vote totals assuming that voter behavior is probabilistic.
More often probabilistic assumptions are applied directly to voters. Uncertainty here arises from indeterminacy about the degree to which candidates will implement campaign promises, nonpolicy considerations like candidates' personal qualities, imperfect mapping of candidates' positions due to incomplete information, weighting of decisions by candidate "competence," ambivalence towards candidates' positions, or other unpredictable factors such as voter mistakes (see Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Bartels 1986; Erikson and Romero 1990 for other explanations). 3 In classic deterministic models, voter choices may be modeled as a piece-wise step function since candidates are selected with certainty (or impossibility). Under probabilistic assumptions, however, voter utility functions are continuous, at least when candidates are similar distances from a voter's ideal point. This formulation resembles a cumulative probability function (an s-curve), as found in Figure 2 . The probability that a voter selects candidate b, P(b), is one or zero on most of the graph but is continuous in a limited range between the two candidates, near (a + b)/2. Note that if this area is wide enough, all voters have nonzero probabilities of selecting each of the candidates. In addition, the probabilistic model is really just a more general case of the deterministic where 0 < P(b) < 1 rather than being constrained to the set {0,1}. Similar functions can be found in Hinich (1977) , Hinich and Munger (1994, Figure 13 ) and Luce and Raiffa (1957, Appendix 1) .
Despite skepticism among some traditional modelers, many studies have adopted this approach in recent years (Coughlin 1982; Nitzan 1981, Enelow, Endersby, and Munger 1993; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and Hinich 1989; Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook 1973; Mueller 1989) .
Figure 2 about here
Theoretically, then, two types of formal voting models are viable. Both deterministic and probabilistic models continue to receive scholarly attention (often developing independently of one another) and each is backed by a cadre of proponents. Having two approaches to studying elections theoretically would not be problematic except that they yield different equilibrium predictions.
Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer to which model should be employed. Ordeshook (1986, 179-180) , for instance, argues that "probabilistic assumptions are reasonable if we consider that candidates are rarely certain about voter preferences and who will vote," yet "deterministic assumptions yield cleaner predictions, and are better suited to uncovering fundamental forces that operate in politics." Given this quandary, I claim that one way to assess that relative strengths of these two models is to compare them empirically. There are too few tests of this type. 4 To those seeking empirical verisimilitude, moving from deterministic to probabilistic voting models has been a leap forward since they allow for uncertainty or imperfection, both of which are inherent parts of real human thought processes. Formal theorists, however, are not universally acceptant of probabilistic models. Many argue that the parsimony and power of rational choice theory has been weakened by modifying assumptions this way. Given the collective ambivalence towards the two models, an empirical test seems a reasonable way to distinguish them. Though researchers have begun to make clever use of existing survey questions to examine the plausibility of probabilistic models, none have compared deterministic and probabilistic models directly using questions that accurately assess each type of voter intention. 5 There is an important distinction to be made here between the terms intention and behavior. These notions are precisely defined in the attitudinal literature, but seldom differentiated in voting research. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, 12-13) provide classic statements of both where behaviors are defined as "observable acts" and an intention is a "person's subjective probability that he will perform the behavior in question."
When formal theorists speak of "probabilistic" or "deterministic" voting, they are actually speaking of different types of intentions. Behavior, in contrast, is the act of voting itself. As such, voting behavior is discrete and deterministic as voters are required to choose one of the candidates on election day. Intentions to vote for a candidate, on the other hand, may be continuous according to both Fishbein-Ajzen and probabilistic voting models.
Drawing upon Fishbein and Ajzen's "Theory of Planned Behavior," the single best predictor of one's behavior is the corresponding intention to engage in it. That is, intentions are the immediate determinants of behaviors and are themselves the product of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. 6 While substantial research has been devoted to estimating the strength of individuals' intentions from these three components as Meier and Campbell (1979) do for the 1972 presidential election (also Ajzen 1991), the analysis below is more directly a comparison of alternate intention measures. Probabilistic assumptions allow the strength of intentions to vary across individuals while deterministic models fix intentions at the ends of the subjective probability dimension. As a result of this connection between the Theory of Planned Behavior and formal voting models, the tests below will reveal the importance of "strength" as an intentional characteristic in the Fishbein-Ajzen model while comparing alternative voting theories.
Methodology
Data for this study are drawn from two omnibus telephone surveys conducted in the state of Ohio before and after the 1986 and 1988 elections. 7 The 1986 pre-election data were collected in October (N = 1013) while the 1988 data were collected in the summer months before the election (N = 988). 8 The 1986 gubernatorial contest pitted Democrat Richard F. Celeste against former Governor James Rhodes.
Celeste upset Rhodes, winning with 61 percent of the popular vote. The 1988 survey focused on two concurrent elections. The presidential election featured Vice President George Bush and Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. Though Dukakis led in the summer polls (when the data were collected), Bush was the victor with 53 percent of the popular vote and 426 electoral votes. In Ohio, the result was similar as Bush received 55 percent. Also that year, Senator Howard Metzenbaum defeated challenger George Voinovich with 57 percent of the statewide vote. Because of the variation in types and contexts of these campaigns, these three elections provide an ideal setting for testing the robustness of probabilistic models.
The gubernatorial election is a state-level contest, the Senate race is statewide but for a federal office, and the presidential election is national. In two elections a Democrat won, in the other a Republican; the presidential race featured no incumbent while the Senate election saw an incumbent reelected and in the gubernatorial election an incumbent was defeated. By examining data from elections that provided different levels of information and had different consequences, one can be confident that inferences are externally valid.
In both surveys, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In the first condition they were asked the standard series of vote questions. In 1988, for instance, the deterministic condition respondents were asked:
As it now stands, George Bush, a Republican, will be running for President, as will Michael Dukakis, a Democrat. Who do you expect to vote for for President? This is the traditional manner in which people have been asked for their vote intentions. Both the American National Election Studies (ANES) and General Social Surveys (GSS) routinely include questions of this form. Responses are dichotomous since individuals are asked their intention to vote for one or the other candidate. In contrast to the deterministic measure, respondents in the second condition were asked new questions that specifically ask for probabilistic vote intentions. For instance,
As it now stands, George Bush, a Republican, will be running for President, as will Michael Dukakis, a Democrat. What is the percent chance you will vote for Bush? What is the percent chance you will vote for Dukakis, the Democrat? 9 This question requires respondents to indicate the degree to which they favor one candidate and is thus continuous. The reported "percent chance" of voting for a candidate can be treated as a probability when divided by 100 since it will lie in the [0,1] interval. Though the deterministic and probabilistic questions differ in some respects, the phrasings are as similar as possible and come from the same survey so that question wording artifacts will introduce minimal error (see Appendix for 1986 question wordings). 10 The hypothesis to be examined is that both are tapping the same construct --the respondent's vote intention --though one allows for discrete, deterministic responses while the other is continuous or probabilistic. Respondents in both conditions were also asked identical batteries of questions dealing with their political attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics.
Analysis
Though the traditional vote intention questions have been asked in national surveys for many years, the probabilistic items have not been used before. As a result, we do not know a priori how individuals will respond to them. Are people naturally able to think of their vote intentions in terms of "percentages" or "probabilities?" If so, do these probabilities correspond to their actual election day voting patterns? And how does the probabilistic measure perform in place of the deterministic question in standard analyses?
This section is devoted to answering these questions, which might be considered concerns about the items' relative reliability and validity.
A natural first question is whether respondents are able to answer the probabilistic questions at all.
If people are not apt to think of their intentions in continuous terms and if the question wording is not sufficiently clear, asking for the "percent chance" of voting for a candidate may be conjuring "nonattitudes," constructs that simply do not exist (Converse 1970) . If this is true, one would expect large numbers of respondents in the probabilistic condition to respond "Don't Know," if at all. Fortunately, the random assignment feature of the TOPS studies allows direct comparison of the missing data percentages in the probabilistic and deterministic question distributions. Table 1 presents these response rate comparisons. As is clear from the table, the new questions compare favorably. In fact, for the gubernatorial and presidential races, more respondents were able to answer the probabilistic than the deterministic question. Respondents were somewhat better at answering the deterministic question related to the senatorial race, but only the difference between the presidential response rates approaches statistical significance. The nonresponse rates are highest for the the informative general election campaigns had begun in earnest. Table 1 
about here
Given that individuals are able to respond fairly well to both deterministic and probabilistic questions, one might wonder how these responses perform relative to one another. That is, do the two questions seem to be tapping the same construct and which best matches actual election outcomes? Table 2 addresses these concerns by summarizing the aggregate vote percentages for the deterministic and probabilistic vote questions along with relevant election results. For the 1986 gubernatorial and 1988 presidential races, the two measures appear comparable as their predictions are all less than two percentage points apart, well within the sampling error. 11 Only for the senatorial election do the questions produce distinguishable results. In this case, the probabilistic responses are much closer to the actual vote. Unlike Bush and Dukakis who were national media figures, the senatorial candidates were relatively unknown in the summer of 1988 and so voters may have been less certain about their positions and personal characteristics. Here is a case where the probabilistic questions seem to be providing more information than traditional vote intention measures.
Table 2 about here
Based on response rates in Table 1 , individuals appear just as willing to supply continuous as discrete vote intentions. In fact, they may be slightly more apt to report probabilities than commit to certain choices. Of particular interest is the group of respondents who report that they have a 50 percent chance of voting for a candidate. Traditional questions do not allow for this form of voter indifference, which 10 to 15 percent of responses chose. 12 Indeed, one might infer that the marginally higher response rates for some of the probabilistic questions are in part a result of allowing for this type of indecision. In addition to knowing that people are able to answer both types of questions, Table 2 shows that the aggregated probabilistic responses match actual election outcomes just as well as the deterministic questions. Thinking of their preferences in terms of percents or probabilities comes relatively naturally.
The percentage of "Don't Knows" provides only limited information. Respondents answer the deterministic and probabilistic questions at similar rates, but the responses themselves may represent different underlying constructs. In the worst case, the probabilistic responses are no more than "doorstep attitudes" (and thus cover for nonattitudes) given to please the interviewer (Bishop et al. 1980; Converse 1970) . If so, they should be weakly related to voting behavior, at least in comparison to the traditional responses. The probabilistic questions are might also tap global attitudes towards or evaluations of the candidates rather than true vote intentions. Like the familiar ANES "feeling thermometers," the probabilistic items might simply allow respondents to rate candidates on 100-point scales based on how favorably they view them. Indeed, researchers use the feeling thermometers as empirical indicators of individuals' ordinal utilities derived from the election of particular candidates (Abramson et al. 1995; Page and Jones 1979; Radcliffe 1993; Weisberg and Rusk 1970) . One might hypothesize that probabilistic responses serve the same purpose.
Both of these plausible scenarios suggest that probabilistic vote questions reveal little information about individuals' vote intentions even if they match aggregate election outcomes. Under the first alternative, many respondents are randomly selecting probabilities when asked because the questions do not present the voting decision as it is naturally considered. Under the second, probabilistic respondents are more similar to thermometer-style attitude or utility measures. To begin examining these alternatives, the probabilistic responses from 1986 are correlated with a variety of measures in Table 3 . Included in the correlation matrix are the percent Celeste and Rhodes measures, the summary difference measure, a trichotomous version of this summary (where indifferents are the middle category), the deterministic question, feeling thermometers for both candidates, and self-reported vote from the post-election survey. If the nonattitudes hypothesis is correct, the probabilistic measures should be weakly related to all of the other items since the latter evoke genuine attitudes while the former do not. If the utility hypothesis is valid, the probabilistic responses should be moderately correlated with all of the other measures, but more strongly with the feeling thermometers than other vote intention questions. If either supposition is supported, the validity of the probabilistic vote questions is in doubt.
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The correlations in Table 3 , however, indicate that neither of these explanations is viable. All of the vote intention measures, whether deterministic or probabilistic, are highly correlated with one another and the actual vote as reported in the post-election survey. The probabilistic and deterministic responses can not be directly correlated since respondents received only one of the question types. Both, however, have correlations of about .85 with reported voting behavior, indicating that they are equally apt at capturing voters' choices. This figure is similar to those found in social psychological studies of voting intentions (Fishbein and Coombs 1974) . In addition, the feeling thermometers have substantially lower correlations with the probabilistic questions --.73 for the two Celeste questions and .61 for the Rhodes measures --and the Celeste thermometer correlates at a higher level with the deterministic question. Neither of the thermometers has a correlation higher than .77 with any other item while none of the vote questions have correlations lower than .83 with one another (z = 1.68, p < .05, one-tailed test). In short, the probabilistic question responses are only moderately correlated with the thermometers, rejecting the nonattitudes hypothesis, and are highly correlated with the traditional vote question and actual votes, rejecting the utility hypothesis.
Based on these results, arguing that the probabilistic questions are eliciting nonopinions or are no more than surrogates for evaluative feeling thermometers is difficult. Of those who gave equal probabilities of voting for Celeste and Rhodes in 1986, exactly half reported voting for each candidate in the post-election survey. In fact, respondents' probabilities predict (reported) voting behavior quite well.
The correlation between the probability of voting for Celeste and the proportions of those at each probability level actually doing so is .97, which is remarkably high and indicates that individuals' assessments of their own voting percentages are accurate.
While these validity checks are worthwhile, one might wonder about the practicality of using probabilistic questions in empirical voting studies. Most campaign and election studies are based on national surveys that use deterministic indicators of respondents' vote intentions. The regression equations that are usually estimated to explain voting behavior in the United States assume that the measure on the left-hand side of the equation is dichotomous since voters may select one of two candidates. The analysis here implies that vote intentions may be measured continuously as well. A question to be considered for future research on voting behavior, then, is how well probabilistic items serve as dependent variables. The design used here allows investigation of this question simply by estimating parallel vote equations with alternative dependent variable measures. The traditional, dichotomous measure can be used in a model for limited dependent variables, here logistic regression. A probabilistic measure --probability of voting for Celeste --is predicted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression since it is (nearly) interval level. 13 Table 4 presents these two simple voting models in which a series of standard sociodemographic and attitudinal variables --ideology, party identification, gender, age, education, family income, race, financial evaluations, and union membership --are common to both equations. The general form of the equations to be estimated is vote intentioni = β0 + β1*conservativei + β2*liberali + β3*Democrati + β4*Republicani + β5*genderi + β6*high schooli + (1) β7*collegei + β8*racei + β9*agei + β10*unioni + β11incomei + β12financesi + εi where an individual's predicted vote intention is equal to yi in the OLS regression and P(yi = 1) in the logit equation. In both equations, positive coefficients indicate greater likelihoods of voting for Celeste, the Democrat. Details on the operationalizations of the twelve independent variables can be found in the Appendix.
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Upon inspection, the deterministic (logit) and probabilistic (OLS) regression equations are difficult to distinguish. To begin, the joint impacts of the independent variables are significantly different from zero in both equations (χ 2 = 87.17, p < .001 and F = 7.31, p < .001). As one might expect, party and ideology are important predictors and operate in the same direction in both equations. In addition, income and personal economic assessments are significant in the logit model while union membership is a significant predictor in the OLS equation. These differences are attributable to the functional forms of the equations rather than the alternative measure of vote preference or differential number of cases determining the t ratios (N = 234 versus 244). 14 The deterministic and probabilistic models can not be distinguished on the basis of explanatory power either. The adjusted R 2 for the OLS model is .25 while the Dhrymes pseudo-R 2 for the logit equation is .27. These values may seem low compared to other regression equations, but recall that the dependent variables are pre-election intentions rather than post-election reports and so are less accurate.
Nonetheless, both measures seem to capture the variation in vote preferences adequately. Given the inconclusiveness of these criteria, a final way to compare the models is to examine their predictive abilities. As is noted above, voting is ultimately discrete since voters must each select a single candidate. Fortunately, both equations produce predicted values that can be recoded to determine how closely each question type approximates actual electoral results. For the logit model, predicted values above .5 are counted as Celeste voters (ones) while values under .5 are Rhodes votes (zeros) since voters are assumed to choose sincerely in a two-candidate race. Using this standard criterion, 73.6 percent of the cases were correctly classified, a reasonable level of prediction relative to the naive 50 percent baseline.
For the OLS equation, values above 50 percent were treated as ones, values under 50 percent as zeros. By this standard, 76.1 percent of cases were correctly predicted. Like the logit model, the aggregate predictive ability of the model was adequate, yielding 61.5 percent Celeste voters compared to the 65.0 percent for the entire sample and 60.9 percent in the actual election. The logit model's prediction was a bit further off at 58.4 percent. The aggregate predicted distribution, however, was skewed in all of the equations due to the modest overestimation of Rhodes voters. In general, the two main equations are nearly indistinguishable. Maximizing the variance explained or classification rate was not the goal here, yet these criteria highlight the overwhelming similarities between these models. As dependent variables in standard recursive vote equations, both the deterministic and probabilistic vote intention questions serve equally well.
Conclusion
This study has compared deterministic and probabilistic voting models using unique survey questions from multiple elections. Though the probabilistic measures are new, I conclude that they perform at least as well as their deterministic counterparts, and in some cases a bit better. In most analyses they can be substituted for one another based on convenience. As measures of vote intentions, both types of survey questions, though imperfect, seem to be equally reliable and valid. Response patterns are similar across surveys and answers are tapping the intended construct. Empirically at least, it is difficult to find large differences between them and so the newer models deserve to be taken seriously. Indeed, probabilistic models should be more than the "curiosities" that many classical modelers view them as (Hinich and Munger 1994, 168) .
The theoretical world is a different matter, however. Formal voting models demonstrate that the differences between deterministic and probabilistic assumptions mean that they can not be easily interchanged since they lead to different equilibria. If the central goal of a formal voting theory is to explain or predict outcomes as opposed to processes, which were under scrutiny here, then it is important to decide which view of voter decision making is best. Classical deterministic models are based on the simplifying assumption that voters possess a great deal of information about the set of candidates or policies from which they are selecting. After examining the alternatives, one simply selects the candidate whose position is perceived to be nearest her or his bliss point.
Probabilistic models, on the other hand, are based on the notion that voter behavior is inherently uncertain.
This uncertainty can have any number of causes, but the consequence is that voters choose candidates probabilistically, that is, without certainty. Survey questions designed to pick up this uncertainty provide at least as much information as their traditional counterparts.
But what does this result mean for the two formal voting theories? It suggests that probabilistic assumptions are well suited for large electorates who must make decisions in noisy environments. Given the inherent ambiguity in presidential and especially congressional and gubernatorial candidates' statements as well as the uncontrollable manipulation of messages by media, pundits, and conversation partners, uncertain voter intentions seem reasonable if not necessary assumptions (Downs 1957; Page and Brody 1978; Shepsle 1978) . Voters find it difficult to reduce such messy messages to points along policy (and perhaps nonpolicy) dimensions, even as an abstraction of reality. This is especially true in subpresidential election campaigns, where most voters know relatively little about the candidates, often not even their names. In these respects, probabilistic models may be an improvement upon classical spatial theories.
This does not mean that deterministic models should be discarded. Standard assumptions that require voters to be certain have shown themselves to be quite fruitful. Deterministic models are powerful yet parsimonious, since they depend on just a few simple assumptions. These models are much more developed as well and have contributed most of what we know theoretically about voter behavior. They are probably most appropriate in situations where voters possess accurate information about the alternatives from which they must select. Such a situation occurs in highly visible and stimulating election campaigns.
Committee voters are also more certain than most citizens (Black 1958; Enelow and Hinich 1984) .
Legislators, for instance, are specialists in policy matters and can consequently be quite confident about their decisions. Elected officials, compared to passive citizens, efficiently assess their own preferences since they must make decisions so much more often and with larger consequences. For elites and highly informed electorates, then, deterministic assumptions seem to be reasonable abstractions of the true process of vote intention formation. For diffuse electorates receiving weak or unclear messages in which they have limited interest, probabilistic assumptions may be required, especially given the uncertainty associated with candidates' positions. Of course, if the empirical validity of assumptions is subordinate to the accuracy of predictions, deterministic models may be appropriate in many of these scenarios as well.
Deterministic
If the election for governor were held today, for whom would you vote? ( Income (1 = family income less than or equal to $10,000, 2 = $10, 001-$20,000, 3 = $20,001-35,000, 4 = $35,001-$50,000, 5 = over $50,000) Finances (1 = better off over the past year, 0 = otherwise) 1. Statistical estimation is inherently stochastic and nonlinear techniques such as logit and probit analysis explicitly generate predicted "probabilities" (e.g. McFadden 1981) . That is, every individual is assigned a specific --and potentially unique --probability of voting for each candidate. This paper does the same based on respondents' self-reports rather than post hoc estimation techniques.
2. This is distinct from the uncertainty about one's perceptions of candidates and their spatial locations (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Bartels 1986 ) and how people misestimate objective probabilities of various states of the world occurring (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974) .
3. Though many, including myself, refer to the classic deterministic model as "Downsian," Downs (1957) did allow for significant voter uncertainty in the second half of his book.
4. In Green and Shapiro's words (1994, 9) , "few theoretical insights derived from rational choice theory have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived." Probabilistic voting models have seen some of the least empirical testing. In fact, Green and Shapiro (148) use a defining text in this area, Coughlin's Probabilistic Voting Theory (1992) , as a poor but "typical" example of recent work, "which in the course of 252 pages makes just four passing references to actual political events and one reference to an election campaign." 5. Maas, Steenbergen, and Saris (1990) used questions that asked for the "probability that . . . you will actually vote for" a particular party in the 1986 Dutch elections. Though novel, their study is of limited applicability here for two reasons. First, they were interested in predicting election outcomes rather than testing models of voter decision making. As a result, they did not have deterministic questions included in the same survey as comparisons. Second, their questions were used in multiparty context rather than the bipolar American setting, where dynamics are different since voters have fewer choices. Meier (1980) and Meier and Campbell (1979) use similar probability measures on a seven-point scale.
6. As Ajzen (1991) summarizes, the Theory of Planned Behavior is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action that allows for external constraints on behavior. Accordingly, either theory can be applied to the voting decision since perceived behavioral control plays little role.
7. The Ohio Political Surveys (TOPS) are conducted biennially by The Ohio State University's Polimetrics Laboratory. I thank Aage Clausen for developing the questions.
8. Most of the analysis here is based on the 1986 study since it, like the ANES, was conducted near election day.
9. Another question leads the probabilistic vote item to help respondents understand the terminology: "Now as to the general election this fall, just as the weatherman talks about the percent chance of rain tomorrow, what is the percent chance that you will go and vote?" Notice that percentages for opposing candidates need not add to 100 percent, yet the data below show that they are often close.
10. In 1986, the deterministic item only mentioned the candidates' party affiliations in a prompt if the respondent hesitated.
11. The 1988 totals mispredict the actual vote since data were collected in the summer, several months before election day.
12. The distribution of probabilistic responses is trimodal with well over half of the cases zero, 50 and 100 percent. Percent Celeste is typical, with a mean of 56.91 and standard deviation 40.89.
13. It may be argued that OLS is an inappropriate estimation technique since the probabilistic variable has an unusual distribution and is confined to [0,100] (see note 12). To check the validity of the OLS results, I also estimated a two-sided tobit equation that accounts for censoring of the dependent variable at both zero and 100. The same five explanatory variables were statistically significant (p < .05, one-tailed test) and identically signed in both the OLS and tobit equations, so that the substantive interpretations required here are the same regardless of the strategy used. It is possible for OLS to predict the individual probabilities over 100 percent, though this occurs in practice for only a handful of cases.
14. For example, a linear relationship apparently best represents the effect of union membership on the tendency to vote Democratic while the effects of income and one's financial situation are nonlinear; those in the middle of the economic distribution are most affected by changes in these variables. 
